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David M. Clark, Institute of Psychiatry at King's College LondonNegative self-images are a maintaining factor in social
phobia. A retrospective study (Hackmann, A., Clark, D.M.,
McManus, F. (2000). Recurrent images and early memories
in social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,
601–610) suggested that the images may be linked to early
memories of unpleasant social experiences. This preliminary
study assessed the therapeutic impact of rescripting such
memories. Patients with social phobia (N=11) attended 2
sessions, 1 week apart. The first was a control session in
which their images and memories were discussed but not
modified. The second was an experimental session in which
cognitive restructuring followed by an imagery with
rescripting procedure was used to contextualize and update
the memories. No change was observed after the control
session. The experimental session led to significant improve-
ment in negative beliefs, image and memory distress and
vividness, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety in feared
social situations. The results suggest that rescripting
unpleasant memories linked to negative self-images may
be a useful adjunct in the treatment of social phobia.
INDIV IDUALS WITH SOCIAL PHOBIA often report
experiencing negative, distorted images when in
social situations. In their negative images they tend
to see their worst fears being realized. Individuals
with a fear of blushing, for example, may have
images in which their face predominates and
appears much larger and more flushed than itThis research was funded by The Wellcome Trust.
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Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.actually is. Clinically, such images appear to be
problematic for a number of reasons. First, patients
often believe that their negative images are an
accurate reflection of how they appear to other
people. They therefore think they come across
much worse than they actually do, which tends to
maintain their social anxiety. Second, the negative
self-images seem to motivate patients to use self-
protective strategies (safety behaviors) that are
themselves problematic, such as covering one’s
face to hide a blush or answering questions with
one-word answers to avoid saying the wrong thing.
Such behaviors prevent patients from disconfirming
their fears (Salkovskis, 1991) and may also have the
consequence of contaminating the social interaction
by making patients appear unfriendly and aloof
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
One of the first empirical studies of imagery in
social phobia was conducted by Hackmann,
Surawy, and Clark (1998). Patients with social
phobia and nonpatient controls were asked to recall
a recent social situation in which they had felt
anxious. They were then asked about any sponta-
neous imagery that may have occurred at the time.
Almost all patients with social phobia reported
experiencing negative images of themselves from
the observer perspective. From this perspective,
they saw their worst fears happening as if viewed
from the outside. They also believed their images to
be true at the time. Nonpatients were significantly
less likely to report observer perspective images
and, in addition, their images were less negative.
In a subsequent study, Hackmann et al. (2000)
used a structured interview that aimed to further
explore the nature of patients’ spontaneous images.
All patients with social phobia reported that their
negative, observer perspective images were recur-
48 wild et al .rent in the sense that they tended to occur in differ-
ent social situations. In addition, the images were
linked in meaning and content to earlier unpleasant
social events that occurred around the onset of the
disorder. The images appeared to be extracted
essences of memories of being criticized, humiliated,
bullied, or experiencing other adverse social events.
The authors hypothesized that early unpleasant
memories lead patients to develop negative images
of how they think they come across to others and
these images are reactivated in subsequent social
situations. Because the images are similar in content
across social situations, it is suggested that they are
not being updated in light of later, more benign
experiences. This may be partly a consequence of
excessive self-focus in social situations (Clark &
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
Using a slightly different paradigm, four other
studies (Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Coles,
Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Wells, Clark, &
Ahmad, 1998; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999) have
investigated the perspective that patients with social
phobia report taking when recalling social situa-
tions. Consistent with Hackmann et al.’s (1998)
findings for spontaneous imagery, all four studies
found that patients with social phobia were more
likely than controls to take an observer perspective
when recalling social events. This effect was largely
confined to memories of social events (Wells et al.,
1998), was more marked with high-anxiety events
(Coles, Turk, et al., 2001), andbecamemoremarked
as time since the event increased (Coles et al., 2002).
To date, three studies have experimentally
manipulated negative self-imagery in individuals
with social phobia or high social anxiety in order to
determine whether it has a role in maintaining the
disorder. All reported positive results. Hirsch,
Clark, Mathews, and Williams (2003) asked
patients with social phobia to have a conversation
with a stranger while holding in mind either their
usual negative image of themselves or a less negative
(control) image. The negative image led participants
to feel more anxious. They also thought their
symptoms were more noticeable and that they had
performed more poorly when they held the negative
image in mind. Further, an assessor, who did not
know which image participants held in mind, rated
their anxiety as more evident and their behavior as
less positive in the negative imagery condition.
Thus, negative self-imagery increased anxiety and
undermined effective social performance.
Vassilopoulos (2005) conducted a similar study
with high and low socially anxious volunteers.
Participants gave a speech in front of a camera. Half
of each group held a negative observer perspective
image during the speech, whereas the other halfheld a positive image of themselves. The high
anxious group perceived more bodily sensations,
rated specific aspects of their performance more
poorly, and believed their self-image to be a more
accurate reflection of how they came across when
they held a negative image in mind.
Hirsch, Meynen, and Clark (2004) had high
socially anxious individuals have two conversations
with a conversational partner. During one con-
versation they held a negative image in mind and
during the other, they held a less negative (control)
image in mind. When holding the negative image in
mind, the socially anxious volunteers felt more
anxious. They also reported using more safety
behaviors and believed that they performed more
poorly. They also overestimated how poorly they
came across compared to ratings the conversational
partners made. Their partners rated them as
performing more poorly in the negative imagery
condition. This study replicated the earlier finding
that negative imagery leads patients with social
phobia to feel and look more anxious. In addition,
it suggested that negative images motivate patients
to use safety behaviors which can, in turn,
contaminate the social interaction.
Recognizing the importance of negative self-
images, several cognitive-behavioral treatment
(CBT) programs for social phobia (for example,
Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark et al., 2003; Heimberg
&Becker, 2002; Rapee& Sanderson, 1998) include
techniques for correcting distorted self-images. Until
recently the techniques (video feedback, surveys of
other people’s observations, behavioral experi-
ments) have all been present-focused and have not
attempted to directly modify the early memories
that are linked to images. However, in a recent trial
of cognitive therapy for social phobia (Clark et al.,
2006), an imagery with rescripting technique was
used to contextualize and update early memories of
unpleasant social experiences in a subset of patients
whose response to the standard, present-focused
techniques was relatively modest. The authors
speculated that use of the technique contributed to
the good overall results observed in the trial but they
were unable to provide data to support this
speculation as the trial did not include a separate
evaluation of the technique.
Imagery with rescripting techniques that focus on
changing unpleasant memories have also been used
as major components of CBT programs for border-
line personality disorder (Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006)
and for posttraumatic stress disorder arising from
childhood sexual abuse (Smucker & Neiderdee,
1995). However, as with social phobia, the specific
impact of the memory-focused techniques was not
assessed.
49memory re scr i p t ing and soc ia l phob iaAs far as we are aware, the only published study
that has attempted to isolate the specific impact of
memory work is Ohanian’s (2001) single case
report. After eight sessions of present-focused CBT,
a 22-year-old woman with bulimia nervosa
reported a 50% reduction in symptoms. Ohanian
(2001) then looked at a critical early event that was
linked to the patient’s most salient beliefs. To
identify it, she asked the patient to describe an
event in childhood in which she had negative
feelings about herself. The rationale was that
beliefs about her self-worth would have originated
or been reinforced during a critical period. The
patient identified an event that occurred when she
was 10 years old. Imagery rescripting involved
having her describe it in the present tense. At the
point in the memory when she felt very hurt, she
was encouraged to visualize her adult self entering
the room to challenge the critical parent and then
offer support and nurturance to her child self. This
one session of memory work was followed by an
almost complete cessation of binge-purge beha-
viors by the 3-month follow-up.
The present study was a preliminary attempt to
identify whether imagery with rescripting focusing
on early memories would generally be helpful in
social phobia if given to an unselected group of
patients in a tightly controlled fashion. It assessed
the impact of rescripting early memories on
negative images and the current symptoms of social
phobia. We predicted that imagery with rescripting
would reduce the strength of patients’ negative self-
beliefs and their anxiety about feared social
situations. We also anticipated a reduction in the
frequency, vividness, and distress of patients’
recurrent images. By contrast, we predicted that
simply exploring the memories would not be
beneficial.Method
design
This study was conducted in a within-subjects,
repeated-measures design. All participants attended
a control session and then a rescripting session 1
week later. They completed measures before, after,
and 1 week following each session. No other
therapy was offered in this period.
participants
Eleven patients (seven female) who were receiving
or about to receive cognitive therapy for social
phobia were recruited. Seven were attending the
Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma in
London and had started treatment (3 to 6 sessions).
For these patients, the study was conducted duringa gap in their therapy. Four had attended the
University Psychiatry Department at the Warneford
Hospital in Oxford for assessment and had not yet
started treatment. Five patients had previously had
emotion-focused counseling, one patient had
attended 3 sessions of CBT for social phobia
many years earlier, and five patients had never
received previous treatment. All met criteria for
social phobia on the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV Axis I (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbons,
&Williams, 1995) and the social phobia module of
the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS;
Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). Participants
had a mean score of 24.00 (SD=5.59) on the Fear
of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson &
Friend, 1969) and 67.27 (SD=31.28) on the
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale—Self-Report ver-
sion (LSAS-SR; Fresco et al., 2001). Their mean
score on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) was 12.09
(SD = 12.46). Their mean age was 35.18
(SD=9.36). The mean age of onset of the disorder
was 16.27 years (SD=11.86). The mean age at
which the memory occurred was 17.09 years
(SD=13.41).
imagery interview
A semistructured interview (Hackmann et al.,
2000) was administered immediately prior to the
control session to elicit the description and meaning
of participants’ recurrent imagery in social situa-
tions. This lasted approximately 30 minutes and
asked a series of standardized questions in a fixed
order. To introduce the interview, participants were
told: “I’d like to talk to you about some of the
things that go through your mind when you get
anxious in social situations. Usually when people
are very anxious a mixture of thoughts and images
or fleeting pictures go through their minds. I’m
especially interested in any pictures or images you
have popping into your mind when you’re anxious.
Do you have any spontaneous images when you are
anxious in social situations?” All participants said
that they did have images. They were asked to close
their eyes and to recreate the image, then describe it.
They were asked if this image recurred in social
situations. All participants identified their image as
recurring across social situations. To determine the
meaning of the image, participants were asked:
What is the worst thing about the image? What
does it mean about you as a person? Participants
were then asked to dwell on their image and to rate
how vivid (real) it felt to them and how distressing it
was (scales described below). They were also asked
to rate how frequently the image had occurred in
the previous week.
50 wild et al .The interview then identified the memory linked
to the image. To do this, participants were asked
when they first remembered feeling the way they
did in their image and to describe the event
associated with that feeling. The interview probed
for the meanings of their memory with similar
questions that had been used to elicit the meaning
of participants’ imagery. Participants were then
asked to dwell on their memory and rate how
distressing the memory was (scale described
below). The interviewer summarized the meaning
of the image and memory and asked participants to
give one or two sentences that would “encapsu-
late” the meanings. One participant, for example,
phrased the encapsulated belief meaning of her
image and memory as “I’m an outsider and always
will be. People will reject me or laugh at me
because I’m not like them”. Her recurrent image
was of looking awkward, jittery, twitchy, and
speaking in garbled sentences. This was linked to a
memory when she was 13 years old and a group of
children at her school cornered her against a wall
and made fun of her and the way she was twitching
and unable to speak. She thought she would be
attacked in front of all the other children and it
would be humiliating.
measures
Encapsulated belief. This belief was elicited in
the semistructured interview. As described above, it
was a statement that captured both the meaning of
the patient’s recurrent image and the linked early
memory. Participants rated howmuch they believed
this statement to be true on a scale ranging from 0
(not at all) to 100 (extremely).
Memory distress. Participants were asked to call
their early memory to mind and to dwell on it. They
were asked how distressing the memory was on a
scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
Imagery ratings: Distress, vividness and fre-
quency. Participants were asked to call their
negative image to mind and to dwell on it. They
were then asked how distressing the image was on a
scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). They were
also asked how vivid it was on the same scale.
Finally, they were asked how frequently the image
had occurred in the previous week.
The above five scales are single-item rating scales
and hence, there are no internal consistency data
available. However, they have been used in a
separate sample of patients with similar levels of
social phobia (N=14) andperformed similarly.With
the exception of image vividness, Pearson correla-
tions of the association between the ratings before
and after the control session in this study were
moderate to strong, suggesting acceptable retestreliability: encapsulated belief (r=0.60, pb0.05),
memory distress (r=0.75, p=0.01), image distress
(r=0.71, pb0.01), vividness (r=0.13, pb0.71), and
frequency (r=0.92, pb0.01).
Social anxiety. Participants completed the FNE
and the LSAS-SR. The FNE is a self-report
questionnaire concerning fears of negative social
evaluation. It consists of 30 true-false statements.
Higher scores indicate greater fear of negative
evaluation. Examples of items include, “I am
frequently afraid of other people noticing my
shortcomings” and “I worry a lot about what my
superiors will think of me.” The FNE is reliable.
For example, Cronbach’s alpha was .92 when the
questionnaire was administered to 150 under-
graduates (Leary, 1983). The test-retest reliability
was also good (r=0.78) (Watson & Friend, 1969).
The internal consistency of the FNE in our sample
was excellent (α=0.89). The FNE has good
validity, discriminating between patients with
social phobia and nonpatient controls as well as
patients with other anxiety disorders (Turner,
Beidel, & Larkin, 1986; Turner, McCanna, &
Beidel, 1987; Stopa & Clark, 1993, 2000). The
FNE correlates highly (r=0.96) with the Brief
FNE (Leary, 1983) that is currently more widely
used.
The LSAS-SR is a 24-item scale measuring fear
and avoidance in the past week of social and
performance situations, such as giving a party,
giving a report to a group, and trying to chat
someone up. Participants were asked to rate how
much fear or anxiety they had for each situation on a
scale of 0 (none) to 3 (severe). They were also asked
to rate how much they avoided that situation on a
similar scale. The total score was derived by
summing the two subscales. The LSAS-SR has
good internal consistency. Among individuals with
social phobia, Cronbach’s alpha for the total score
was .95 (Fresco et al., 2001). In our sample,
Cronbach’s alpha was .97. The LSAS-SR shows
strong convergent and discriminant validity (Fresco
et al., 2001).
In addition to completing the LSAS-SR, partici-
pants were asked to nominate their two most feared
situations on this questionnaire and to imagine
these scenarios with their eyes closed. They then
rated how anxious each one made them feel on a
scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). They also
rated how well they could picture each scenario in
their mind’s eye on the same scale. The mean of the
anxiety and picture ratings was calculated for both
situations to give one score each: (1) Liebowitz
anxiety score, which refers to how anxious the
scenarios made them feel when they imagined them
and (2) Liebowitz picture rating score, which refers
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their mind’s eye.
These rating scores, similar to the rating scales
discussed above, are single item. There are no
internal consistency data available for them. How-
ever, it was possible to gauge retest reliability.
Pearson correlations of the association between the
ratings before and after the control session were
strong, suggesting good retest reliability: Liebowitz
anxiety (r=0.74, pb0.01) and Liebowitz picture
(r=0.83, pb0.01).
Presession measure. Participants completed the
BDI prior to the control session. The BDI is a 21-
item self-report questionnaire that measures the
severity of depression in the previous week. Every
item includes a group of four statements scored
from 0 to 3, with higher numbers reflecting more
severe depression. Participants were asked to read
each group of statements and to circle the one
statement that best described the way they had
been feeling in the past week for the 21 items. The
values of all 21 items were summed to give a total
score. The BDI is reliable. Internal consistency in
clinical (α = 0.86) and nonclinical samples
(α=0.81) is excellent (Beck, Steer, & Garbin,
1988). Coles, Gibb, and Heimberg (2001) reported
that the retest reliability in patients with social
phobia was strong (r=0.84). Further, the BDI is a
valid measure of depressive symptoms in psychia-
tric and normal samples (Beck et al., 1988;
Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978; Kendall,
Hollon, Beck, & Hammen, 1987). Participants
completed the BDI once, prior to the control
session. The internal consistency in our sample
was excellent (α=0.96).
interventions
The control procedure involved one and a half
hours of exploring the early memory and the
recurrent image. This was a nondirective session
in which the therapist listened, reflected, and
empathized but did not challenge or update the
meaning of the early memory or recurrent image.
Participants were encouraged to recall the early
memory, to talk about how it made them feel, what
it reminded them of, and whether they had other
similar experiences in their lives.
The memory rescripting intervention built on
Arntz and Weertman’s (1999) procedure in which
patients revisit their memory in three stages.
However, it differed in that it first involved
cognitive restructuring. This was carried out for
approximately 45 minutes prior to rescripting,
which in itself lasted approximately 30 to 45
minutes. During the cognitive restructuring phase,
the therapist and patient worked together tochallenge the meaning of the early event and its
implications for the present. For example, if a
patient had been bullied and interpreted the event
as meaning “I’m an outsider and always will be
because I’modd and different and weak; people will
reject me or laugh at me if I am myself,” he was
encouraged to come up with alternative ways of
seeing the event. This would include thinking of all
the reasons why children bully other children and
what this says about the children who did the
bullying, rather than him. He would also be
encouraged to think of examples in which he was
not rejected then or now. In essence, the therapist
helped the patient to distinguish between what
happened when he was a young child/teenager and
what happens now as an adult in order to help him
to see the event as a time-limited experience without
implications for the present or future. The aim was
to generate an adult perspective that the patient
would then incorporate in the rescripting phase.
During memory rescripting, patients first ima-
gined they were the age at which the event occurred
and relived it as if it were happening again. Then
they relived the memory at their current age,
watching what happened to their younger self,
and intervened if they wished, often conveying to
the younger self the alternative perspective they had
come up with in the cognitive restructuring phase.
Finally, they relived it from the perspective of their
younger self with their adult self in the room with
them, intervening as before. This time the younger
self was also asked what else he might need to
happen in order to feel better, and the image then
incorporated this material too. The younger self
often requested extra nurturing and compassion at
this point.
For each patient, the control and memory res-
cripting interventions were delivered by one of two
clinical psychologists. Both had extensive training in
cognitive therapy and had prior experience in
rescripting memories linked to intrusive images.
procedure
The semistructured interview was administered to
identify participants’ recurrent images, linked
memories, and the encapsulated beliefs that covered
both. The therapist then administered the control
procedure. One week later, participants attended
the rescripting session. A week after the rescripting
session, a final set of measures was administered.
Some measures were given at the beginning and end
of the control and rescripting sessions. Some other
measures were only given at the beginning of the
control/rescripting sessions and 1 week later. Table
2 shows which measures were given at which time
point.
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within-session change: encapsulated
belief, memory distress, and anxiety
about social situations
Due to the small sample size, we investigated
within-session change by computing difference
scores between measures taken at the beginning
and end of the session and then performed t-tests to
compare the magnitude of within-session change
between the control and rescripting sessions.
Difference scores were calculated for: (a) the
encapsulated belief, (b) memory distress, (c) the
Liebowitz anxiety score, and (d) the Liebowitz
picture rating score. The ratings after the control
and rescripting sessions were subtracted from the
ratings taken at the beginning of these sessions.
Table 1 shows the mean change in scores for the
control and rescripting sessions. Compared to the
control session, the rescripting session led to a
significant reduction in how much participants
believed their encapsulated belief, t(10) =3.6,
pb0.01, and how distressing they found their
early memory, t(8)=4.5, pb0.01. The rescripting
session was also associated with a significantly
greater reduction in participants’ anxiety ratings
when visualizing their most feared social situations
than the control session, t(10)=3.5, pb0.01. The
two sessions did not differ in their effects on the
vividness with which participants could visualize
their most feared situations. t(10)=1.9, p=0.23, as
indexed by the Liebowitz picture scale.
one-week follow-up: anxiety about
social situations, fear of negative
evaluation, and ratings for imagery,
memory, and encapsulated belief
Repeated-measures analyses of variance with three
levels (pre-control, follow-up control/pre-rescript-
ing, and follow-up rescripting) were performed on
measures of social anxiety and participants’
ratings of their intrusive images and encapsulated
beliefs.Table 1
Means (and standard deviations) of within-session change for the
encapsulated belief, memory distress, Liebowitz anxiety and
Liebowitz picture scores: Control versus rescripting sessions
Measure Within-Session Change
Control Session
(SD)
Rescripting Session
(SD)
Encapsulated Belief 11.36 (25.99) 52.95 (26.38)
Memory Distress 7.22 (12.28) 40.56 (22.14)
Liebowitz Anxiety 0.68 (11.84) 27.05 (22.02)
Liebowitz Picture 0.07 (29.10) 10.00 (16.51)
Note: Higher scores indicate greater improvement.Table 2 shows the mean scores and standard
deviations at the different time points, as well as the
significance level of the paired contrasts. There was
a significant effect of time for the encapsulated
belief ratings, Liebowitz anxiety scores, and FNE
scores. Paired contrasts showed that 1 week after
the rescripting session, encapsulated belief, Liebow-
itz anxiety, and FNE scores had decreased signifi-
cantly. In contrast, 1 week after the control session
there was no change in encapsulated beliefs or
social anxiety. The time effect for Liebowitz picture
ratings was not significant, indicating that the two
sessions did not differ in how well participants
could visualize their most feared situations.
Turning to the image and memory ratings, there
was a significant effect of time for the vividness of
participants’ naturally occurring images and for the
distress associated with those images. Paired con-
trasts showed that 1 week after the rescripting
session, image distress and image vividness had
significantly decreased. In contrast, 1 week after the
control session, there was no change in either image
distress or image vividness. There was also a
significant effect of time for participants’ ratings
of the distress associated with their memories.
Paired contrasts showed that, 1 week after both
the rescripting and the control sessions, memory
distress had significantly decreased. The latter
finding differs from the within-session analysis
which found that the control procedure had no
effect on memory distress. Finally, the time effect
was not significant for image frequency, indicating
that during the short period of the study, there was
not a significant decline in the frequency of
participants’ images.Discussion
This study is the first to investigate the therapeutic
impact of rescripting social phobia–related trau-
matic memories. A control session in which patients
simply explored their trauma memory led to no
change in the meaning of the memory (encapsulated
belief) and had no effect on either spontaneously
occurring imagery or self-reported measures of
social anxiety. In contrast, one session of memory
rescripting produced significant within-session
change in the meaning of the traumatic memory,
the distress associated with the memory, and the
amount of anxiety experienced when patients
imagined participating in their two most feared
social situations. In addition, 1 week after the
memory rescripting session, patients reported that
their spontaneously occurring images were less vivid
and distressing. There was also a significant reduc-
tion in patients’ scores on the FNE, a standardized
Table 2
Means and standard deviations at pre-session, post-session and 1-week follow-up on measures of social anxiety, imagery and memory
Measure Pre-Control
Session (1)
Post-Control
Session (2)
Follow-up
after Control
Session/Pre-
Rescripting
Session (3)
Post-
Rescripting
Session (4)
Follow-up
after
Rescripting
Session (5)
Analysis Significance
of Paired
Comparisons
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F df 1 vs. 3 3 vs. 5
Liebowitz Anxiety 68.41 15.70 67.73 17.16 64.09 23.96 37.05 29.45 40.45 27.90 8.76⁎⁎ 2, 20 0.538 0.009
Liebowitz Picture 67.66 21.00 69.20 19.59 71.81 16.44 61.81 20.00 57.05 25.47 2.73 2, 20 - -
Encapsulated Belief 76.82 20.16 65.45 28.06 74.77 24.91 21.82 20.41 24.09 21.31 36.91⁎⁎⁎ 2, 20 0.749 0.001
Memory Distress 68.18 27.14 60.56 28.22 53.18 26.48 8.89 15.37 22.27 19.92 17.28⁎⁎⁎ 2, 20 0.025 0.001
FNE 24.00 5.59 23.91 5.56 17.91 10.26 6.25⁎ 1.03, 10.34 0.863 0.041
Image Frequency 18.96 29.32 12.09 29.24 9.32 15.95 2.36 2, 20 - -
Image Distress 50.00 26.55 47.73 27.78 19.55 25.54 8.40⁎⁎ 2, 20 0.724 0.005
Image Vividness 60.91 23.75 51.82 29.01 26.82 33.45 5.36⁎ 2, 20 0.410 0.015
Note. FNE=Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. Repeated measures analyses of variance conducted with three levels (pre-control, follow-up
control/pre-rescripting, and follow-up rescripting). Degrees of freedom in analysis of FNE adjusted for heterogeneiry of variance.
∗pb0.05, ∗∗pb0.01, ∗∗∗pb0.001.
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together, these results suggest that memory rescript-
ing is an effective intervention in social phobia and
may be worth considering as an adjunctive proce-
dure in CBT programs. In the only treatment trial to
date that has used the procedure (Clark et al., 2006),
it was restricted to patients who had failed to show
adequate response to more present-focused techni-
ques. Our finding that memory restructuring was
beneficial in a less restrictively selected group of
patients suggests it may have broader applicability
and might be usefully included as a routine
procedure in cognitive therapy for social phobia.
Future research will need to address the issue of the
stage in therapy (early or late) at which rescripting
might be most usefully introduced.
Memory rescripting has been a major compo-
nent in some CBT programs for borderline
personality disorder (Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006)
and posttraumatic stress disorder arising from
childhood sexual abuse (Smucker & Neiderdee,
1995). The finding that memory rescripting alone
was effective in the present study suggests that it
may have been an important contributor to the
good outcomes obtained within those disorders.
However, studies that isolate the effects of memory
rescripting in the relevant disorders are needed to
confirm this suggestion.
There are several possibilities as to how memory
rescripting may exert its effect: it involves repeated
evocation of the traumatic memory, cognitive
restructuring, inserting new information derived
from cognitive restructuring into the memory with
an imagery exercise, and introducing a compassio-
nate perspective, all of whichmay help the patient to
reappraise the original event. In exposure treatment
for posttraumatic stess disorder (PTSD), Foa andRothbaum (1998) have shown that planned and
controlled evocation of a traumatic memory can
lead to its reevaluation. Although undoubtedly
important, repeated evocation of the memory does
not account for the results seen in this study,
however. This is because both the control and
rescripting sessions involved repeated evocation of
the socially traumatic memory but improvements
were only observed after the rescripting session.
The design of the study did not allow us to look at
the separate contributions of cognitive restructur-
ing, inserting new information into the memory,
and a compassionate perspective. A future compo-
nent analysis study will be required to definitively
address this issue. However, the integrated proce-
dure that was used in this study was the result of
extensive pilot work with simpler interventions that
only used some of the components and seemed less
promising. We therefore suspect that each element
played a useful role. The cognitive restructuring
allows the patient to identify a convincing argument
against the encapsulated belief. In our work with
PTSD, we have found that intellectual shifts of this
sort can be limited in their impact if the new
information is not explicitly introduced into the
trauma memory during a planned reliving (see
Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004, for an
extended discussion), and the same may have
applied here. In the compassionate imagery part
of the intervention (Hackmann, 2005), the adult
self revisited the traumatized self and was compas-
sionate with affection and soothing words. This
may enhance the patient’s feeling of being accepted,
a central concept in social phobia.
One of the main effects of memory rescripting
was that it reduced anxiety about feared social
events. This may be a direct result of the reappraisal
54 wild et al .of the original event, leading to more adaptive,
present relevant beliefs. However, patients also
reported less vivid and distressing images after
memory rescripting. Thus, it is possible that part of
the reduction in social anxiety was mediated
through changes in the nature of patients’ sponta-
neous images. This is consistent with previous
research (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2003; Hirsch et al.,
2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) in which social phobics
and high socially anxious individuals were less
anxious having a conversation with a stranger
when they held a neutral image in mind compared
to when they held a negative image in mind.
Considering Coles et al. (2001), it is also possible
that the perspective of the memory changed with
imagery rescripting. That is, patients may have
experienced a more field and less observer perspec-
tive of their early memory, and this may have led
them to feel less anxious about their usual feared
situations. Perspective of the early memory was not
measured in this study and would be a worthy focus
of further research.
Contrary to hypothesis, there were no changes in
the frequency of patients’ negative images following
the rescripting session. As both the control and
rescripting sessions were focused on the image and
memory, patients were naturally more likely to be
thinking about them in the week following their
session. This may explain why there were no
changes in frequency, despite the observed changes
in vividness and distress. If this is correct, we would
have expected to see a reduction in image frequency
had we followed patients up for a longer period
after the memory rescripting.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding in this study
is the time in which patients experienced change.
Change occurred within one session and it was
maintained 1 week later. A possible reason for this
quick change is that working in imagery is like
having a concrete experience (Epstein, 1994). Lang
(1977, 1979) suggests that the physiological,
emotional, and behavioral responses activated
during imagery are similar to what is activated in
real scenarios. Drawing on research in neu-
roscience, we see that imagery of movement, for
example of the hands, toes, or tongue, uses the same
cortical circuitry (e.g., Schnitzler, Salenius, Salme-
lin, Jousmäki, & Hari, 1997) and results in the
same motor cortical activation (e.g., Ehrsson,
Geyer, & Naito, 2003) as actually moving these
parts of the body. This suggests that at the level of
brain activation, imagining movement is similar to
actually doing it. Although imagery rescripting is
much more than imagining movements, it is
possible that the physiological, emotional, and
behavioral responses it generates feel as real asactually having these experiences, and this may be
therapeutic for clients. Further, imagery rescripting
invokes many senses, and this may result in better
activation of implicational meaning representations
necessary to change them (Teasdale, 1993).
This pilot study has limitations. First, the sample
size was small. Despite this, significant changes
were seen in the rescripting session, which is
encouraging. However, replication with a larger
sample would be desirable. Second, it was not
possible to counterbalance the order of the control
and rescripting sessions. They were given in a fixed
order with the control session offered first. This is
because rescripting updated the original memory.
Therefore, the control session would have had little
material to explore had rescripting been offered
first. Given the fixed order of sessions, we are
unable to rule out the effects of the passage of time.
Third, it is possible that there was a sequence effect
in which giving the control session first made the
rescripting session more effective. A future study
could employ a between-subjects design in which
groups are matched for symptom severity and one
group receives rescripting, the other a control
intervention. Fourth, we also used single-item
rating scales in relation to imagery, memory, and
belief ratings as well as anxiety and picture ratings
of feared scenarios on the LSAS-SR. There are
limited psychometric data on these measures and a
future study would benefit from using well-estab-
lished measures to assess imagery, memory, and
anxiety in relation to feared scenarios. Never-
theless, preliminary analyses of these scales did
suggest good retest reliability with the exception of
image vividness. The assessment of retest reliability
of the image vividness scale may reflect the lack of a
relationship between how vividly patients experi-
ence their recurrent image before and 1 week after
the control session, rather than poor retest relia-
bility of the scale. Further studies are needed to
assess the reliability and validity of these measures.
Fifth, the small sample size meant that we were
unable to use multivariate statistics to provide
alpha correction for our use of multiple measures.
Sixth, the study would have benefited from a longer
follow-up period to track how long the changes
last. This was not possible because the patients were
all receiving cognitive therapy or about to start.
Finally, this study relied exclusively on self-report
measures of social anxiety (FNE and anxiety ratings
for patients’ two most feared situations). A measure
to assess behavior change, such as having a
conversation with a stranger or giving a public
talk, would be desirable. However, in their rando-
mized controlled trial comparing cognitive therapy
to exposure and applied relaxation, Clark et al.
55memory re scr i p t ing and soc ia l phob ia(2006) found that change on self-report measures of
social phobia correlated with change on behavior
tests. Therefore, it seems likely that the change on
self-report measures of anxiety seen in this study
following rescripting would also be associated with
change on behavioral measures of social anxiety.
Future studies could test this prediction.References
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